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Nature loves to hide.
H!RACLITuS
§ 1 TWO CONC!PTIONS OF EXP!RI!NC!
When Norm perceives a red tomato in his garden, Norm perceives the tomato and
its sensible qualities—Norm perceives something red, round, and bulgy. Not only
does Norm perceive the red of the tomato but Norm also perceives what that red
is like—Norm can see that it is reddish and not at all bluish. Moreover, there is a
way in which it is like for Norm to perceive the tomato. What it is like for Norm to
perceive the red tomato is diﬀerent from what it is like for Norm to perceive a green
tomato. Not only are these experiences numerically distinct they are qualitatively
distinct as well.
Let us say that this qualitative distinction is a diﬀerence in the phenomenal prop-
erties of these experiences. Phenomenal properties, so understood, are properties
of experience at least in the minimal sense corresponding to the fact that we can in-
telligibly classify experiences on the basis of their phenomenology. What it is like
for Norm to perceive a tomato is a property of Norm’s experience of the tomato
and not a property of the tomato itself. The phenomenal properties of Norm’s
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experience of the tomato are thus distinct from the qualities of the tomato, even
its sensible qualities such as being red, round, and bulgy. The sensible qualities of
the tomato perceptually available from Norm’s point of view may be perceptually
present in Norm’s experience of it, but they are properties of the tomato and not
of Norm’s experience of the tomato.
Phenomenal properties and sensible qualities may be distinct, but this is not to
say that they are unrelated. Talk of phenomenal properties is merely meant to reg-
ister a respect in which experiences may diﬀer—it is, so far at least, noncommittal
as to how this diﬀerence is to be understood. Thus, for example, it is consistent
with the present linguistic regimentation that an experience having the phenome-
nal property that it does is constituted by the quality that is perceptually present
to the subject in the experience—just as the regimentation is consistent with phe-
nomenal properties being subjective monadic qualities of experience.
What is the relation between colors and the phenomenal properties of our ex-
perience of them? A naïve thought is this—the phenomenal character of color ex-
perience is determined by the qualitative character of the perceived color. When
Norm perceives a red tomato, the phenomenal character of his color experience is
determined, at least in part, by the qualitative character of the redness manifest in
his experience of the tomato.
According to the naïve conception of color experience, the phenomenal charac-
ter of color experience is determined by the partial perspective it provides on the
chromatic features of the material environment. To know what it is like to undergo
a color experience would be to know the color selectively presented to the per-
ceiver’s partial perspective (see Nagel, 1979, 166, 172, 173–4). An experience would
be intrinsically connected to its subject matter since experience, so conceived, just
is a perceptual presentation of that subject matter to a perceiver’s partial perspec-
tive. According to the naïve conception, then, experience is relational. Compare
Hume’s characterization of experience as conceived by the vulgar:
…when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they al-
ways suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the exter-
nal objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing
but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white,
and which we feel hard, is believed to exist independent of our per-
ception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it.
(Hume, 1740/2006, 113–4)
Not all philosophers accept the naïve conception of color experience—Hume
maintained that it took the “slightest bit of philosophy” to reveal its inadequacies.
Indeed, from at least the early modern period, a persistent temptation has been to
conceive of color experience, not as a relation to the chromatic features of the ma-
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terial environment, but as the qualitative eﬀect of that environment, as a conscious
modiﬁcation of the perceiving subject.
Placing an object a certain distance from another does not modify that object,
only its location—though, of course, changing the distance among its parts will
modify an object. Thus moulding a lump of clay into triangle modiﬁes that lump
of clay. On the naïve conception, an experience is not a modiﬁcation of the perceiv-
ing subject since the relata are not, in this way, constituent parts of the perceiver.
So conceived, the perceiver is not modiﬁed by being perceptually presented with
objects, qualities, and relations of the material environment. However, on the al-
ternative conception, experience is a modiﬁcation of the perceiving subject in the
way that being triangular is a modiﬁcation of the clay. But whereas experience is
a conscious modiﬁcation, being triangular is not. So understood, the phenomenal
character of color experience, what it is like for a perceiver to undergo that experi-
ence, is a monadic quality of a mental episode, the color experience elicited in the
perceiver by some material cause in the environment.
On the naïve conception, experience may not be, in  this  sense, a qualitative ef-
fect of the material environment, but that is not to say that there are no perceptual
eﬀects, so conceived. There is nothing incoherent about a cause having a relational
eﬀect (where a relational eﬀect is an event constituted by the obtaining of a rela-
tion). And there is nothing incoherent about the relational eﬀect of a cause con-
sisting in the obtaining of a relation between a thing and that cause. (Consider the
power of the wind to cause a weather vane to point in its direction.) The crucial
diﬀerence is that on the naïve conception of experience perceptual eﬀects are not
conscious modiﬁcations of the perceiving subject.
On the conception of experience as a conscious modiﬁcation of the perceiving
subject, not only are experiences understood to be the qualitative eﬀects of mate-
rial causes, but the causal correlation is suﬃciently systematic to be epistemically
signiﬁcant. The qualitative character of experience must be suﬃciently varied for
experiences with a certain quality to be reliably correlated with features of the ma-
terial  environment. The causal correlation between qualitative experiences and
features of the material environment is suﬃciently reliable, across a broad range of
cases, for the immediate, noninferential perceptual judgments that we are liable to
form on their basis to be at least warranted if not indeed a mode of knowledge of
those features.
The conception of experience as the qualitative eﬀect of the material environ-
ment is what Johnston (2006) describes as “The Wallpaper View” and what Martin
(1998) attributes to Ducasse (1942). It is familiar from the early modern period.
Thus, Walter Charleton, following Gassendi, in a vein that will subsequently be-
come typical, writes:
By the Quality of any Concretion, we understand in the General, no
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more but that kind of Appearance, or  Representation  whereby  the  sense  doth
distinctly deprehend, or  actua#y  discern  the  same, in the  capacity  of  its  proper
Object. An Appearance we term it because the Quale or Suchness of every
sensible thing, receives its peculiar determination from the relation it
holds to that sense, that peculiarly discerns it. (Charleton, 1654, 128)
Though prominent in the seventeenth century, it continues to have its advocates.
Thus Block (1996) and Chalmers (2004, 2006) oﬀer sophisticated variants of it.
Reﬂection on Moore’s transparency intuition might count against conceiving of
color experience as the qualitative eﬀect of material causes:
In general, that which makes a sensation of blue a mental fact seems
to escape us: it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent—we
look through it and see nothing but the blue. (Moore, 1903, 37)
When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the
blue: the other element is as it were diaphanous. (Moore, 1903, 41)
Moore is right at least to this extent: In introspectively reﬂecting on what it is like
to undergo a color experience, a perceiver attends only to what that experience
is of or about, and not at all to the qualities of experience, if any. However, this
is so far consistent with conceiving of color experience as the qualitative eﬀect of
the material environment, for attention is one thing and introspective awareness
another. Thus Block writes:
An ontology of colors of things plus internal phenomenal characters of
our perception of those colors is all that is needed. I think that the
only grain of truth in [the] phenomenological point is that when we try
to attend to our experience in certain circumstances, we only succeed
in attending to what we are seeing, e.g., the color of the apple. But
attention and awareness must be ﬁrmly distinguished. For example, we
can experience the noise of the refrigerator (and be aware of it in that
sense) but only notice it or attend to it when it ceases. (Block, 1999)
Some philosophers, representationalists prominent among them, have held that
reﬂection on transparency establishes a stronger claim, one that is inconsistent
with conceiving of color experience as the qualitative eﬀect of material causes. In
introspecting what it is like to undergo a color experience, the reason we attend
only to the color of the perceived object and not to any quality of the experience
is because the perceived color, and not any quality of experience, determines the
phenomenal character of that experience (see, for example, Harman, 1990). While
this latter claim is indeed inconsistent with the present conception of color expe-
rience, it is a substantive explanatory claim and not the deliverance of intuition.
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As long as there are intelligible alternatives to this explanatory claim, it may be
intelligibly doubted. (For more on these two interpretations of transparency see
Crane 2006; Martin 2002; Siewert 2003; Stoljar forthcoming.)
§ 2 M!TAM!RISM AND KNOWING WHICH
I believe that color experience has a presentational phenomenology inadequately
captured by the view that color experience is merely the qualitative eﬀect of mate-
rial causes. I do not believe, however, that this disagreement is fruitfully pursued
by reﬂection on transparency alone. Instead, I will argue that there is an aspect of
color phenomenology that is epistemically signiﬁcant—an epistemic signiﬁcance
that color experience could not have if it were merely the qualitative eﬀect of ma-
terial causes.
It is a common place observation that two garments can match in color appear-
ance when viewed in a store and yet fail to match in color appearance when viewed
in sunlight. The ﬂuorescent lighting of many stores is notoriously prone this kind of
metameric pairing—where two samples are metameric pairs if they match in color
appearance in one condition and yet fail to match in color appearance in others
and where the colors instantiated by metameric pairs are metameric counterparts.
In an environment known to be populated by metameric pairs, a savvy shopper
has a motive to vary the conditions of illumination suﬃciently to determine, say,
whether those trousers really do match that shirt.
However, even if Norm, a normal perceiver, is not involved in a matching task,
in an environment known to be populated by metameric pairs, Norm can still be
motivated to vary the conditions of illumination in order to determine the color
of an object, say by taking the object out of the shop and into the sunlight. An
interest in knowing which color an object is, quite apart from any matching task, is
suﬃcient to motivate varying the conditions of illumination. Norm is not trying to
enjoy a veridical experience of the color, one had only under speciﬁc conditions of
illumination, conditions that failed to obtain in the shop. Though Norm veridically
perceives the color even under the initial conditions of illumination, his perception
of the color is insuﬃcient for Norm to know which color he is perceiving. It is only
by viewing the object under diﬀerent conditions of illumination that Norm is in a
position to know, or at least be conﬁdent, which color he is perceiving.
If perception provides only a partial perspective on the sensory aspects of the
material environment, then this observation is a natural one. The partiality of
perception has recently been defended by Hilbert (1987), but it has ancient roots
as well—arguably, Heraclitus is an advocate (see Kalderon, forthcoming):
Heraclitus’ message was quite diﬀerent: not the empty subjectivity of
sensible appearances but their one-sided partiality. …Are they right or
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we? The implied answer is that each is right—from his own point of
view. It follows that the diﬀerent but equally valid points of view are
one-sided, partial reﬂections of reality. At some deeper level, from as it
were an absolute god’s-eye vantage-point, the opposition and contrast
is overcome. The sea is both pure and impure; mud is both clean and
dirty; rubbish is wealth. (Burnyeat, 1979, 69)
Not only is perception partial in the sense that there are properties of an object not
perceptually available (objects may have unobservable aspects), not only is percep-
tion partial in the sense that some sensible qualities of an object may be occluded
from view (the backs of objects are colored as well), but perception is also partial
in the sense there are sensible qualities of an object that are not determined by
a given perception. If perception is partial, as a Heraclitean epistemology would
have it, then it is intelligible that not every aspect of a perceived color is determined
by a given perception of it. In the store, under initial conditions of illumination,
Norm veridically perceives the color; moreover, Norm perceives what that color
is like—at least to some extent. Thus Norm can perceive that the color is a deter-
minate of certain suﬃciently broad color determinables. Nevertheless, not every
aspect of the color of the object is manifest to Norm in his initial color experience.
The qualitative nature of the color is insuﬃciently manifest in Norm’s perceptual
encounter with it for Norm to know which color he is perceiving.
The phenomenal character of color experience can vary under diﬀerent con-
ditions of illumination. The same color instance can elicit phenomenally distinct
color experiences in diﬀerent conditions of illumination. Norm’s experience of the
color of the garment in the shop is phenomenally diﬀerent from Norm’s experience
of that color in broad daylight. This is an aspect of the explanatory challenge posed
by the phenomena of color constancy—to explain how the color of an object can
appear the same and yet diﬀerent across a broad range of scenes and conditions of
illumination. (Human color color vision does not exhibit constancy for every possi-
ble scene and every possible condition of illumination. The explanatory challenge
is, rather, to explain the degree of constancy it exhibits in some scenes in some
range of illumination.) Moreover, it is by undergoing these phenomenally distinct
color experiences that Norm is in a position to know, or at least be conﬁdent,
which color the garment is. This is a positive epistemic achievement. A subject
thereby gains knowledge—by means of a course of phenomenally distinct color
experiences, a subject comes to know which color the object is. This achievement
is only possible if the diﬀerent phenomenal characters of Norm’s color experience
in the store and in daylight has positive epistemic signiﬁcance. It is only by under-
going these phenomenally distinct color experiences that Norm can come to know
which color the garment is.
Two clariﬁcations are in order. First, the claim is not just that color experience
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has positive epistemic signiﬁcance, but that a speciﬁc aspect of color experience,
its phenomenal character, has positive epistemic signiﬁcance. Second, the claim is
not that, in all circumstances, in order to know which color he is perceiving, the
perceiver must vary the conditions of illumination. If the circumstances are propi-
tious, Norm can tell at a glance that the tomato in his garden is a particular shade
of red. It is only necessary to vary the conditions of illumination to know which
color is being perceived in certain circumstances, such as an environment known to
be populated with metameric pairs. In such circumstances, the phenomenal char-
acter of the distinct experiences elicited under diﬀerent conditions of illumination
is epistemically signiﬁcant.
If, however, color experience were merely the qualitative eﬀect of material causes,
then the phenomenal character of color experience could not have this positive
epistemic signiﬁcance. Recall that qualities of color experience are supposed to be
suﬃciently varied for them to be reliably correlated with features of the material
environment, and that the causal correlation between qualitative experiences and
features of the material environment is suﬃciently reliable, across a broad range of
cases, for the immediate, noninferential perceptual judgments that we are liable to
form on their basis to be at least warranted if not indeed modes of knowledge of
those features. The qualitative character of color experience is only epistemically
signiﬁcant insofar as there is a reliable correlation between experiences with that
character and features of the material environment. Color experience is merely a
causal intermediary between between features of the perceiver’s material environ-
ment and the perceptual judgments that the perceiver is liable to form about that
environment.
The qualitative character of color experience is thus not devoid of epistemic sig-
niﬁcance. As Johnston has observed, the qualitative character of color experience,
so conceived, can have a negative epistemic signiﬁcance:
For a subject used to enjoy sensory qualia, the loss, or fading, or inver-
sion of qualia should be an alarm bell, a warning that things are far from
normal. That certainly can have epistemic signiﬁcance; in particular it
can provide a ground for withholding beliefs about the scene before the
eyes, and, more generally, for withholding beliefs about the scenarios
before the senses. (Johnston, 2006, 261)
While the phenomenal character of color experience, so conceived, can have a
negative epistemic signiﬁcance, it can be hard to understand how it could have the
kind of positive epistemic signiﬁcance it must have if undergoing phenomenally
distinct experiences of the same color under diﬀerent conditions of illumination
suﬃces for knowing which color is being perceived.
If color experience were the qualitative eﬀect of the material environment, then
what epistemic signiﬁcance it would have would entirely derive from being a causal
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intermediary in the reliable connection between perceptual judgment and its sub-
ject matter—a subject matter that concerns those features of the material environ-
ment that are among the causal antecedents of that experience. Notice that system-
atically varying the qualitative character of experience would preserve the reliable
connection between perceptual belief and the causal antecedents of color experi-
ence. Indeed, the reliable connection would be preserved if experience lacked a
qualitative character altogether. The ﬁrst possibility corresponds to the possibil-
ity of the inverted spectrum. Suppose that what it is like for Norm to see a violet
corresponds to what it is like for Norma to see a marigold. Though their color ex-
periences diﬀer in qualitative character, each are reliably correlated with features
of the material environment and so equally a source of warrant or knowledge about
those features. The second possibility corresponds to the possibility of philosoph-
ical zombies, sentient creatures altogether lacking a perceptual phenomenology
that are nevertheless capable of reliably forming perceptual beliefs about their envi-
ronments. If the epistemic signiﬁcance of a qualitative experience entirely derives
from being a causal intermediary in the reliable connection between perceptual
judgment and its subject matter, an epistemic signiﬁcance shared by qualitatively
distinct experiences or causal intermediaries that lack a qualitative character alto-
gether, then the fact that an experience instantiates a certain quality lacks positive
epistemic signiﬁcance about the obtaining of an environmental condition.
The problem is not that there is a contingent connection between the quali-
ties of experience and the sensible qualities of the material environment. I am
granting, for the sake of argument, that the connection between perceptual judg-
ments and the color instances that are their subject matter is suﬃciently reliable,
across a broad range of cases, for such judgments to be at least warranted if not
indeed a mode of knowledge of the colors. But reliable connections are themselves
contingent, and so the contingent connection between the qualities of experience
and the qualities of the material environment is not the problem. The problem,
rather, is that the sole source of epistemic signiﬁcance of color experience, con-
ceived as the qualitative eﬀect of the material environment, consists in its being a
causal intermediary in the reliable connection between perceptual judgments and
the color instances that are their subject matter. But being a causal intermediary in
the reliable connection between perceptual judgment and its subject matter does
not require that experience have a particular quality or indeed that it have a qual-
itative character at all. And that means that the phenomenal character of color
experience, understood as a monadic quality of that experience, could not have
the positive epistemic signiﬁcance it must have, if by undergoing a color experi-
ence with a particular phenomenal character a subject can come to know which
color he is perceiving. If color experience is the qualitative eﬀect of the material
environment, then its epistemic signiﬁcance entirely consists in its relational fea-
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tures; but then it is hard to understand how phenomenal character, as such, could
have positive epistemic signiﬁcance when conceived as a nonrelational feature of
experience.
If color experience were merely the qualitative eﬀect of the material environ-
ment, its phenomenal character thereby lacking positive epistemic signiﬁcance,
then how could Norm come to know which color he is perceiving by undergoing
qualitatively distinct experiences of that color under diﬀerent conditions of illumi-
nation? Determining which color he is perceiving is a positive epistemic achieve-
ment. How could Norm come to know which color he is perceiving simply on
the basis of undergoing qualitatively distinct experiences of that color, where this
qualitative distinction has only negative epistemic signiﬁcance? He could not—and
yet he manifestly can. And so we must reject the conception of color experience as
merely the qualitative eﬀect of the material environment. At least some aspects of
color experience must have a presentational phenomenology, if color experience
is to have the positive epistemic role it manifestly has. At least some aspects of
color phenomenology must be determined by the perceptually present color if that
experience is to have positive epistemic signiﬁcance for the perceiver in forming
perceptual beliefs about the material environment. (For a similar recent suggestion
about presentational phenomenology and perceptual justiﬁcation see Pryor, 2000,
note 37, Pryor, 2004, section 4, and Pryor, 2005, 356–7.)
§ 3 DISPOSTIONALISM
Perhaps the positive epistemic signiﬁcance of color phenomenology can be recon-
ciled with color experience being the qualitative eﬀect of the material environment
given a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of the colors. Locke (1706, 2.8.10)
characterizes secondary qualities as “Such Qualities, which in truth are nothing in
the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their pri-
mary Qualities.” It is unclear what Locke meant exactly, but on one philosophically
inﬂuential interpretation, colors are dispositions to cause color experiences with a
certain qualitative character. Consistent with the contingent connection between
cause and eﬀect, there would be a necessary connection between the qualitative
character of color experience and the nature of the perceived color since the per-
ceived color just is the power to produce color experiences with that qualitative
character.
So conceived, the colors would be manifest in our veridical color experience in
distinct, but related, senses:
1. Veridical color experiences would be the manifestation of perceived color in
the sense that color experience would be the exercise of a dispositional color
property.
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2. Veridical color experience would be the manifestation of perceived color in
the sense that color experience would be the presentation of the perceived
color.
On the dispositionalist’s account, these senses are importantly related—the former
explains the latter. Dispositional color properties are presented in veridical color
experience by veridical color experience being the exercise of dispositional color
properties:
These sensory manifestations are not simply eﬀects of the dispositions
they manifest. They are or can be manifestations in a more interesting
sense. About any disposition of objects to produce a given experience,
it is plausible to hold that if one has an experience of the kind in ques-
tion and takes that experience to be a manifestation of the disposition
in question, one thereby know the complete intrinsic nature of the dis-
position. (Johnston, 1992, 167)
So understood, perceived color similarities would “be visually apparent similarities
among the colors, not merely similarities among the visual appearances which the
colors, whatever they may be like, cause” (Johnston, 1992, 163). Color experiences
would not be causal intermediaries between the colors and perceptual judgments
concerning them—they would be the exercise and so the presentation of dispo-
sitional color properties whose instantiation ground objective similarities in the
material environment.
Two observations about dispositionalism are relevant here.
First, veridical color experiences are conceived to be the manifestations of dispo-
sitional color properties. Dispositionalism, however, makes no further claim about
the nature of color experience. It is consistent with dispositionalism that color ex-
perience be the qualitative eﬀect of the material environment, but dispositionalism
is consistent, as well, with other conceptions of color experience. Thus Johnston
(1992, postscript) observes that dispositionalism is also consistent with a variant of
representationalism according to which color experience is a sui generis proposi-
tional attitude and what Johnston calls the multiple relation theory of experience
according to which color experience involves nonpropositional acquaintance with
the visible elements of the perceived scene. While dispositionalism and the con-
ception of color experience as a conscious modiﬁcation of a subject are logically
distinct doctrines, there is, at least, a historical connection—the conception of col-
ors as secondary quality emerges in the early modern period in the context of this
conception of experience. (I am tempted to say: this is its proper home.)
Second, if dispositionalism can explain how the qualitative character of color
experience can have positive epistemic signiﬁcance, this is only because disposi-
tional color properties would be present in their exercise. This is an important
10
3 Dispostionalism
partial concession—that the positive epistemic signiﬁcance of color experience is
properly explained only in terms of its presentational phenomenology.
While dispositionalism may be able to explain how dispositional properties can
be present in the qualitative eﬀects of the material environment, it fails to explain
how a color appears to persist through phenomenally distinct experiences. What
dispositionalism fails to explain is how there could be a course of experience in
which the phenomenal character of the experience varies but in which one has an
experience of a constant, persisting, colored surface.
Johnston, in an extended defense of dispositionalism, understands the phenomenon
of color constancy in terms of the contrast between steady and transient color:
A basic phenomenological fact is that we see most of the colors of ex-
ternal things as “steady” features of those things, in the sense of features
which do not alter as the light alters and as the observer changes posi-
tion (this is sometimes called “color constancy”.) A course of experience
as of the steady colors is a course of experience as of light-independent
and observer-independent properties, properties simply made evident
to appropriately placed perceivers by adequate lighting. Contrast the
highlights: a course of experience as of the highlights reveals their re-
lational nature. They change as the observer changes position relative
to the light source. They darken markedly as the light source darkens.
With suﬃciently dim light they disappear while the ordinary color re-
main. (Johnston, 1992, 141)
Moreover, Johnston argues that a Protagorean variant of dispositionalism can
exploit this distinction to interpret the naïve contrast between ‘real’ and ‘apparent’
colors:
It is not widely recognized that a color relativist can consistently ﬁnd
some truth in many remarks about “real” colors. Chromatic lights are
said to obscure the real colors of patches viewed under them. The color
relativist avoids one kind of invidious distinction between the standard
disposition of a cloth to look pinkish blue in daylight and the standard
disposition of the same cloth to look simply pink under pink light. For
the relativist, both are equally veridical colors. But the second color
is, as things ordinarily go, the color associated with the more transient
and interrupted appearance of the cloth. If we mean by “real color” the
least transient veridical color then daylight and ordinary indoor light do
typically reveal the real colors of things. (Johnston, 1992, 158–60)
There is reason to doubt, however, that color constancy is adequately explained
in terms of steady and transient color.
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First, any such explanation is arguably incomplete. While the distinction be-
tween steady and transient color might capture a diﬀerence in color appearance
that can occur in diﬀerent circumstances of perception, it would not be the only
diﬀerence. The color of a surface can appear diﬀerent in diﬀerent scenes and con-
ditions of illumination because of the diﬀerently distributed highlights, reﬂections,
and shadows, but not every qualitative diﬀerence can be explained as a diﬀerence
in transient color. Suppose that Norm is looking at a red chip with a matte surface,
unshadowed, in diﬀuse light, in a monochromatic environment. If we dim the light
somewhat but within the bounds of ‘normality’, then the qualitative character of
Norm’s experience will vary. This is a case of color constancy—the color of the chip
appears unaltered through the course of phenomenally distinct experiences—but
the phenomenal diﬀerence is not due to a diﬀerence in transient color for none are
present.
The second quotation oﬀers a diﬀerent application of the idea of transient color.
The Protagorean, despite his generous metaphysics, can accept that the cloth is ‘re-
ally’ pinkish blue even though it looks pink in the prevailing pink light by letting
the least transitory color count as ‘the real color’. The case of a cloth looking pink-
ish blue in broad daylight and simply pink in pink light involves veridical and non-
veridical experiences. Being simply pink excludes being pinkish blue, so if the color
of the cloth remains unaltered at most one of these experiences could be veridical
(in the sense that the Protagorean seeks to reconstruct). But Norm’s coming to
know which color he is perceiving by varying the conditions of illumination is a
diﬀerent kind of case. The color experiences elicited in in the store and in daylight
are both veridical. So the qualitative diﬀerence between these experiences could
not be a diﬀerence in the least transient of the presented colors as the Protagorean
understands this.
I doubt that the distinction between steady and transient color can explain the
variety of color constancy phenomena. The dispositionalist must explain at least
some of these in another way. An obstacle to any such explanation is immediately
salient. On its usual formulation, dispositionalism is schematically represented as
follows:
Color c = the disposition to elicit experience e in normal perceivers in
normal circumstances.
Suppose that color experience is the qualitative eﬀect of the material environment.
The elicited experience ewould be qualitatively typed—so understood, a particular
color would be the disposition to elicit color experiences with a particular quali-
tative character. In cases of color constancy, however, the qualitative character of
color experience varies with the conditions of illumination across a broad range
of circumstances a#  of  which are normal, on any reasonable interpretation of that
notion (on the diversity of ‘normal’ circumstances see, among others, Austin, 1962;
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Dummett, 1993; Hardin, 1993). Thus a tomato can look a particular shade of red
to Norm in the supermarket, in noon daylight on a cloudless day, on an overcast
afternoon, and so on. Though the tomato appears to be a particular shade of red
in all of these circumstances, the qualitative character of the experience elicited in
each of these circumstances diﬀer. Though the tomato appears to be a particular
shade of red, and the same shade of red, the particular shade of red does not appear
the same way to Norm when presented in noon daylight and when presented on
an overcast afternoon. Each of these circumstances of perception are normal, on a
reasonable interpretation of that notion. But then there is no qualitatively unique
experience elicited in normal perceivers in normal circumstances.
Perhaps dispositionalism can be reformulated. Perhaps colors are dispositions to
elicit, in normal perceivers, qualitatively distinct experiences in diﬀerent circum-
stances of perception, all of which are normal. Dummett can be read as holding
such a position:
…anyone accustomed to the uses of observational predicates knows at
least implicitly, and will recognize on reﬂection, that they stand for es-
sentially dispositional properties, for a propensity to present a range of
appearances under a variety of conditions. (Dummett, 1993, 398)
depending, of course, on how “range of appearances” is interpreted (see section 5
for the ambiguity of such idiom). There are two models of how this might be:
1. The qualitatively distinct manifestations might be manifestations of diﬀerent
dispositions in diﬀerent circumstances.
2. The qualitatively distinct manifestations might be manifestations of the same
disposition in diﬀerent circumstances.
Either model, however, faces a metaphysical problem about the unity of the colors
that precludes a dispositionalist explanation of color constancy.
Suppose that the qualitatively distinct manifestations are manifestations of a
diﬀerent of dispositions. Colors, so conceived, are clusters of dispositions. Each
disposition in the cluster has a determinate qualitative manifestation in a certain
circumstance of perception. What unites the cluster of dispositions associated
with a color instance? Not every plurality of such dispositions constitute a color.
The disposition to appear red in one circumstance and the disposition to appear
green in a diﬀerent circumstance do not ﬁgure together in any of the cluster of dis-
positions associated with individual colors. Joint possession of these dispositions
is not a way of being colored. (A CD can jointly possess these dispositions, but what
color is a CD?) A cluster of dispositions is a plurality of dispositions related in a cer-
tain way. But what relation on the plurality of dispositions would explain how the
joint possession of the plurality is a way of being colored?
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The challenge is acute since a naïve answer is precluded. The cluster of disposi-
tions could not be united by the color itself. To appear red in certain circumstances
would be to appear the way red things appear to normal perceivers in those circum-
stances. So conceived, however, colors would be response-independent qualities of
the material environment that explain, in part, the way they are disposed to appear
in diﬀerent circumstances of perception. (For a defense of the naïve answer see
Yablo’s, 1995, discussion of singling out properties. See also Campbell, 1997.)
Suppose that the qualitatively distinct manifestations are not the manifestations
of diﬀerent dispositions but are manifestations of the same disposition in diﬀerent
circumstances. So conceived, red is the unitary disposition of things to have a cer-
tain pattern of qualitative eﬀects on normal perceivers in a range of circumstances
all of which are normal. The problem of unity, however, arises again, though in a
diﬀerent way. Why are the qualitatively distinct manifestations manifestations of
a unitary disposition? If there is a genuine distinction between the qualitatively
distinct manifestations being the manifestations of a plurality of dispositions or a
unitary disposition in a plurality of circumstances, there is a way for the qualita-
tively distinct manifestations to be united as the manifestations of a unitary dis-
position. But what way is that? And what reason do we have for thinking that it
obtains in the present case?
The challenge is acute since a naïve conception of a unitary property appear-
ing diﬀerently in diﬀerent circumstances of perception is precluded. Though the
tomato appears to be a particular shade of red, and the same shade of red, the
particular shade of red does not appear the same way to Norm when presented in
noon daylight and when presented on an overcast afternoon. In noon daylight, the
particular shade of red appears the way that color appears in noon daylight. On an
overcast afternoon, the particular shade of red appears the way that color appears
on an overcast afternoon. (Compare Austin’s, 1962, example of perceptual con-
stancy: a straight stick submerged in water does not appear bent; it appears the
way that a straight stick appears when submerged in water.) The diﬀerent ways
the color appears are ways the color is presented to be in diﬀerent circumstances
of perception. Diﬀerent visible aspects of the color’s constant capacity to modify
light are perceptually available in diﬀerent circumstances of perception. So con-
ceived, however, colors would be response-independent qualities of the material
environment that would explain, in part, the way they are disposed to appear in
diﬀerent circumstances of perception.
The problem of unity is inseparable from the phenomenon of color constancy.
As Johnston observes:
A course of experience as of the steady colors is a course of experience
as of light-independent and observer-independent properties, proper-
ties simply made evident to appropriately placed perceivers by adequate
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lighting. (Johnston, 1992, 141)
Light-independent and observer-independent properties ‘simply made evident to
appropriately placed perceivers by adequate lighting’ are sensible qualities of the
material environment presented to a perceiver’s partial perspective on that envi-
ronment. But that is not to conceive of color experience as the qualitative eﬀect
of the material environment. Nor can the relevant notion of presentation be recon-
structed if the presented colors are dispositional. Consider the view that colors are
clusters of dispositions. The individual dispositions may be consciously manifest
in their diﬀerent qualitative eﬀects, but the appearance of the constant color per-
sists through these qualitative diﬀerences. What’s made evident to appropriately
placed perceivers by adequate lighting is what unites the cluster of dispositions.
Thus without an answer to the problem of unity, the present version of dispo-
sitionalism lacks an explanation of color constancy. But the problem of unity is
insoluble. What’s made evident may be what unites the cluster of dispositions,
but what’s made evident to appropriately placed perceivers by adequate lighting is
simply the color of the object. So conceived, however, colors would be response-
independent qualities of the material environment that would explain, in part, the
way they are disposed to appear in diﬀerent circumstances of perception. This is
an application of Anscombe’s insight:
Further, we ought to say, not: “Being red is looking red in normal light
to the normal-sighted,” but rather “Looking red is looking as a thing
that is red looks in normal light to the normal-sighted.” (Anscombe,
1981, 14)
While dispositionalism may be able to explain how dispositional properties can
be present in the qualitative eﬀects of the material environment, it fails to explain
how a color appears to persist through qualitatively distinct experiences.
§ 4 INH!RITANC!
Recall our epistemological problem is this: Perceptually distinguishing the color of
an object from its metameric counterpart is a positive epistemic achievement. A
subject thereby gains knowledge—by means of a course of phenomenally distinct
color experiences, a subject comes to know which color the object is. If, however,
color experience were the qualitative eﬀect of the material environment, then it
would be hard to understand how the phenomenal character of color experience
could have this positive epistemic signiﬁcance. Suppose the epistemic signiﬁcance
of a qualitative experience entirely derives from being a causal intermediary in the
reliable connection between perceptual judgment and its subject matter. The prob-
lem is that the qualitative character of the intermediary can vary while preserving
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the reliable connection. The dispositionalist attempted to evade this problem by
denying that the qualitative eﬀects are causal intermediaries. They are, instead,
manifestations of the perceived color—the qualitative eﬀects are the exercise and
so the presentation of dispositional color properties. Dispositionalism failed, how-
ever, to explain how a color appears to persist through qualitatively distinct experi-
ences. Unfortunately, the phenomenology of color constancy is essential to Norm’s
positive epistemic achievement. When Norm perceives the color of the garment in
the store and then in daylight, the color appears to persist through these phenome-
nally distinct experiences. It is because the color appears diﬀerent in daylight than
it did in the store, even though it appears to be the same color, that Norm can come
to know which color the garment is. It is only by presenting a further qualitative
aspect of the persistent color, a qualitative aspect perceptually available in daylight
and not the store, that Norm’s experience allows him to distinguish the color from
its metameric counterpart and so come to know which color he is perceiving.
To complete this case two further clariﬁcations are required. First, we need to
get clearer about the presentational phenomenology necessary for color experi-
ence to have positive epistemic signiﬁcance. Second, we need to get clearer about
what is presented in the qualitatively distinct color experiences that explains how
a perceiver could come to know which color they are experiences of. These are the
tasks of this section and the next.
Recall we distinguished weaker and stronger interpretations of transparency (sec-
tion 1). The weak interpretation consists in the negative observation that in intro-
spection the perceiver attends only to what the experience is of or about and not
to any quality of experience. If we can distinguish what we can attend to in intro-
spection and what we are introspectively aware of, then this is consistent with the
phenomenal properties being monadic qualities of experience whose instantiation
depends on the subject’s awareness of them. The stronger interpretation consists
in an explanatory claim inconsistent with phenomenal properties being monadic
qualities of experience—that the sensible qualities of the perceived object deter-
mine, at least in part, the phenomenal properties of the perceptual experience.
Thus when Norm perceives a red tomato, an aspect of the phenomenal character
of his experience, its color phenomenology, is determined by the perceived color
quality, the redness of the tomato. As Campbell (1997, 189) puts it,“the qualitative
character of the color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of the
color”. At a minimum, this involves the following claim:
A diﬀerence in the sensible qualities present in experience suﬃces for
a diﬀerence in the phenomenal properties of that experience.
Four observations are relevant understanding to this claim.
First, as presently formulated, the claim is noncommittal as to the nature of the
objects, qualities, and relations present in experience. Thus, for example, sense-
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datum theorists such as Price (1932) maintain that reﬂection on conﬂicting expe-
riences and allied antinomies such as the problems of illusion and hallucination
reveal that the objects present in perceptual experience are nonmaterial and that
the qualities and relations present in experience are qualities and relations of these
nonmaterial objects. (Even Moore, who struggled manfully to maintain that it was
at least an open question whether sense-data were perceived material surfaces, suc-
cumbed in the end.) As opposed to this, representationalists and naïve realists
maintain that, at least in the case of veridical perception, the presented objects,
qualities, and relations can be features of the material environment. On this, I side
with the representationalists and naïve realists. Though I provide no argument for
this claim, I will assume the following for the purposes of this paper:
Objects, qualities, and relations of the material environment can be
present in a subject’s perceptual experience of that environment.
More speciﬁcally, and controversially, I will assume that:
Colors are among the mind-independent qualities of the material envi-
ronment that can be present in a subject’s perceptual experience.
Second, the claim is noncommittal as to the nature of perceptual presentation.
Representationalists maintain that the sensible qualities present in experience de-
termine at least some of the phenomenal properties of that experience. More-
over, they maintain that the sensible qualities present in experience just are the
sensible qualities that that experience represents. In so doing, they endorse a sub-
stantive and controversial claim about perceptual presentation—that perceptual
presentation just is perceptual representation. As opposed to this, sense-datum
theorists and naïve realists maintain that perceptual presentation is nonrepresen-
tational. For the purposes of this paper, I will be neutral about the representational
character of perceptual presentation.
Third, this is not yet to endorse the converse claim—that a diﬀerence in the phe-
nomenal properties of experience suﬃces for a diﬀerence in the sensible qualities
present in that experience. First of all, the phenomenal properties of experience
may be due in part to the objects and relations present in that experience. Even
if understood inclusively in this way—that a diﬀerence in the phenomenal prop-
erties of experience suﬃce for a diﬀerence in the objects, qualities, or relations
present in that experience, the claim may still be intelligibly doubted. Perhaps the
way something is presented in experience, as well as what’s presented, can make
for a phenomenal diﬀerence. Thus, for example, Martin (2002) argues that the
phenomenal diﬀerence between the perception of a sensible quality and the sen-
sory imagining of that quality is due to the way the sensible quality is presented
in perception and sensory imagination, respectively. Extending this to the case of
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color, the phenomenal diﬀerence between perceiving a color and imagining a color
is due to the diﬀerent ways in which the color is presented in perception and visual
imagination, respectively.
There are negative and positive claims here.
The negative claim, which is surely right, concerns the limitations of arguing
from the epistemic properties of experience to experience having a presentational
phenomenology. The most that such an argument could establish is that some as-
pect of the phenomenology of experience must be determined by an object, qual-
ity, or relation present in experience—it could not establish that every aspect of
the phenomenology of experience must be determined by an object, quality, or
relation present in experience. The argument thus does not establish the general
claim that a diﬀerence in the phenomenal properties of experience suﬃce for a
diﬀerence in what’s present in that experience.
The positive claim is a suggestion about what could determine the phenomenal
properties of experience in cases, if there are any, where they are not determined by
something present in experience—perhaps the way in which something is present
in experience can determine at least some aspects of its phenomenology. Even
granting that there may be aspects of the phenomenal character of experience not
determined by what is present in that experience, and even if it were apt to de-
scribe these phenomenal aspects as ways of presenting objects, qualities, or rela-
tions, one might resist this characterization since it is liable to mislead. After all,
the thought that the phenomenal character of color experience is a way of present-
ing the perceived color is part of the motivation for thinking of color experience
as the qualitative eﬀect of material causes.
Whether or not phenomenology is exhaustively presentational, the phenomenal
diﬀerence between Norm’s color experience in the shop and in daylight must be
due to presentational diﬀerence if it is to have the positive epistemic signiﬁcance it
must have if on the basis of these phenomenally distinct experiences Norm could
come to know which color he is perceiving.
Fourth, and ﬁnally, to claim that some aspect of phenomenology is presenta-
tional is to claim more than certain phenomenal properties covary with something
present in experience, even if the covariation is counterfactual. It involves as well
an explanatory claim—an experience has the relevant phenomenal property be-
cause of what is present in experience. This is implicit in the modal implications
of Campbell’s metaphor of “inheritance”. To claim that the qualitative character of
color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of the presented color
is to claim that the qualitative character of the experience depends on and derives
)om the qualitative character of the presented color.
While the explanatory claim entails that the relevant aspect of phenomenal char-
acter covaries with something present in experience, the converse entailment fails.
18
5 Knowing Which Explained
Thus, for example, Chalmers (2006) accepts that the phenomenal properties of
experience covaries with what’s present in experience (where perceptual presen-
tation is understood representationally), but maintains that experience represents
what it does because of its phenomenal properties:
A phenomenal  content of a perceptual experience is a representational
content that is determined by the experience’s phenomenal character.
(Chalmers, 2006, 50)
Though Chalmers is not as careful as he might be to distinguish the explanatory
and covariation claims as he continues:
More precisely: a representational content c of perceptual experience
e is a phenomenal content if and only if necessarily, any experience
with the phenomenal character of e has representational content c.
(Chalmers, 2006, 50)
This is merely a claim of necessary covariation that lacks the explanatory asymme-
try entailed by talk of determination. Indeed it is a claim of necessary covariation
accepted even by those who accept the converse order of explanation—that ex-
perience has the phenomenal properties that it has because of its representational
content. For the same reason, I believe that Byrne (2001) is wrong to formulate rep-
resentationalism as a supervenience thesis—it is rather an explanatory claim with
the supervenience thesis as a consequence. (See Hilbert and Kalderon, 2000, for a
variant argument for this claim, and see Martin, 2002, for further relevant discus-
sion.) This is worth emphasizing since the epistemic role of perceptual experience
is linked to this order of explanation.
§ 5 KNOWING WHICH EXPLAIN!D
Subject to the qualiﬁcations discussed in the previous section, let the inheritance
thesis, in its full generality, be the following claim:
An experience inherits a phenomenal property from something pre-
sented in that experience just in case what’s presented in experience
determines the phenomenal property of that experience.
However, our present concern is not with the inheritance thesis in its full gener-
ality but with a restricted version of it. Recall, there is a phenomenal diﬀerence
between Norm’s experience of a color instance in diﬀerent conditions of illumina-
tion. Norm’s color experience in the ﬂuorescent lighting of the store diﬀers in its
phenomenal properties from Norm’s color experience in broad daylight. It is these
phenomenal properties that are being claimed to be presentationally determined.
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At ﬁrst blush, this can seem surprising. How could color phenomenology be de-
termined by the perceptually present color—after all the same color is perceptually
present in the phenomenally distinct experiences. Indeed, it is natural to describe
this diﬀerence as diﬀerent ways of presenting the color. And this is precisely what
Norm’s phenomenally distinct color experiences would be, if color experience were
merely the qualitative eﬀect of the material environment. If the color is present in
a perceiver’s experience only in the anemic sense of its instances reliably causing
such experiences, then phenomenally distinct experiences of that color would be
qualitatively distinct modes of presentation. A color’s looking diﬀerent in diﬀer-
ent conditions of illumination, is not a matter of what appears to the perceiver but
the way the color appears.
As natural as this description is, it is a misdescription. It is, after all, episte-
mologically inadequate—it fails to explain how color phenomenology can have the
positive epistemic signiﬁcance it manifestly has. It is true that the color appears
diﬀerently in diﬀerent conditions of illumination and that the phenomenal diﬀer-
ence between experiences of that color in diﬀerent conditions of illumination is
due, in part, to the diﬀerent ways that color appears. But this last claim is ambigu-
ous, and the apparent phenomenological aptness of the description in the previous
paragraph is due to an equivocation.
If we say:
The tomato appears red to Norm.
we are entitled to claim, in addition, that:
There is a way that tomato appears to Norm.
Here, “way” functions as a device of generalization quantifying over adjectival po-
sitions. Since “way”-talk involves, in this instance, a generalization over adjectival
position, it must take, as its semantic value, the semantic value assigned to adjec-
tives—a property, that is, a property that an object must instantiate in order for the
adjective to correctly apply. Red is the way the tomato appears to Norm. Redness
is a property of the object of Norm’s experience—it is the color present in Norm’s
experience of the tomato, a color in virtue of which the adjective “red” correctly
applies, if it does. It is a property of the object of experience and not a property of
the experience.
Not only does “way” function as a device of generalization quantifying over ad-
jectival positions, but it can quantify over adverbial positions as well. Thus, for
example, if we say:
The tomato appeared ﬂeetingly to Norm
we are entitled to claim, in addition, that:
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There is a way the tomato appeared to Norm.
Since “way”-talk involves, in this instance, a generalization over adverbial position,
it must take, as its semantic value, the semantic value assigned to adverbs—a prop-
erty of properties, that is, a property that a property must instantiate in order for
the adverb to correctly apply. Fleetingly is the way the tomato appeared to Norm.
Fleetingness is a property of Norm’s experience of the tomato (understood as a
property of Norm’s)—it is the temporal character of Norm’s experience, a tempo-
ral character in virtue of which the adverb “ﬂeetingly” correctly applies, if it does. It
is a property of the experience and not a property of the object of that experience.
Deprived of context, talk of the way something appears is ambiguous. It might
be interpreted as a property of the perceived object and so present in experience,
or it might be interpreted as a property of the experience and so a way the object
of experience is presented. This need not be due to any confusion about whether
“way” governs an adjectival or adverbial position. Thus a claim of the form:
o appears F to S
may, in a certain context, be used to assert how o appears—as instantiating F ; but,
equally, it may, in a certain context, be used to assert how S is—S is such as o to
appear F to S (as opposed to o appearing G, or not at all). Any generalization of
this claim involving “way”-talk will simply inherit this ambiguity. (See Brown, 2006;
Martin, 1998, for further relevant discussion.)
When Dummett (1993, 398) writes of a “propensity to present a range of ap-
pearances under a variety of conditions”, there are two ways to understand this.
The “range of appearances” are diﬀerent ways the color appears in diﬀerent cir-
cumstances of perception. The diﬀerent ways that the color appears might be
interpreted as properties of experience, or they might be interpreted as proper-
ties of the object of experience. On the former interpretation, the diﬀerent ways
the color appears are qualitatively distinct experiences elicited in diﬀerent circum-
stances of perception. On the latter interpretation, the diﬀerent ways the color
appears are the diﬀerent properties of the color that appear in diﬀerent circum-
stances of perception. So consider again: The color appears diﬀerently to Norm in
diﬀerent conditions of illumination, and the phenomenal diﬀerence between ex-
periences of that color in diﬀerent conditions of illumination is due, in part, to the
diﬀerent ways that color appears. The diﬀerent ways the color appears might be in-
terpreted as properties of experience, or they might be interpreted as properties of
the object of experience. On the latter interpretation, the diﬀerent ways the color
appears are diﬀerent properties of the color that appear in diﬀerent conditions of
illumination.
If perception provides only a partial perspective on the sensory aspects of the
material environment, as a Heraclitean epistemology would have it, it is at least pos-
sible that diﬀerent aspects of a color’s qualitative nature are perceptually available
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in diﬀerent circumstances of perception to a given perceiver. In the store, under
initial conditions of illumination, Norm veridically perceives the color. Moreover,
Norm perceives what that color is like—at least to some extent. Thus Norm can
perceive that the color is a determinate of certain suﬃciently broad color deter-
minables. Nevertheless, not every aspect of the color of the object is manifest to
Norm in his initial color experience. The qualitative nature of the color is insuﬃ-
ciently manifest in Norm’s perceptual encounter with it for Norm to know which
color he is perceiving.
When Norm undergoes phenomenally distinct color experiences under diﬀer-
ent conditions of illumination, there are diﬀerent ways the color appears to Norm.
In the store, under initial conditions of illumination, the color appears a certain
way, it presents a qualitative aspect in common with its metameric counterpart. In
broad daylight, the color appears another way, it presents a qualitative aspect that
distinguishes it from its metameric counterpart. These distinct ways of appearing
are not properties of Norm’s experience of the color, but are properties the color is
perceived to have. Norm’s phenomenally distinct color experiences are not qualita-
tively distinct modes of presentation of the color, rather the phenomenally distinct
color experiences present qualitatively distinct aspects of the perceived color. It
is only by presenting a further qualitative aspect of the color, a qualitative aspect
perceptually available in daylight and not the store, that Norm’s experience allows
him to distinguish the color from its metameric counterpart and so come to know
which color he is perceiving.
If the diﬀerent ways the colors appear are not properties of experience but prop-
erties of the object of experience, what properties might these be?
There is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of color that provides both
an account of the relevant properties of the perceived color and explains Norm’s
ability to know which color he is perceiving by undergoing phenomenally distinct
experiences of it under diﬀerent conditions of illumination. Though I cannot argue
for this metaphysical hypothesis here, a sketch of it suﬃces for a plausible account
of the relevant properties of the perceived color the presentation of which in dif-
ferent circumstances of perception explains Norm’s ability to know which color he
is perceiving.
Suppose that colors are neither primary nor secondary qualities, but, in the tra-
ditional post-Lockean vocabulary, tertiary qualities. Locke characterizes these qual-
ities as follows:
The Power that is in any Body, by Reason of the particular Constitu-
tion of its primary Qualities, to make such a change in the Bulk, Figure,
Texture and Motion of another Body, as to make it operate on our Senses
diﬀerently from what it did before. (Locke, 1706, 2.8.23)
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Locke’s (1706, 2.8.23) own examples of tertiary qualities are “the Sun has a Power to
make Wax white, and Fire to make Lead ﬂuid”. If colors were qualities determined
by ways of aﬀecting light, then colors would be Lockean tertiary qualities, at least
on a reasonable generalization of that notion. Surface color, so conceived, would
be determined by a power of surfaces, by reason of the particular constitution of
their material properties, to make such a change to the spectral composition of
the light so as to make it operate on our sense of sight diﬀerently from what it did
before. (“Before”, here, should be understood as a temporal metaphor for a modal
claim—the reﬂected light operates on color vision diﬀerently from the way the
incident light would if it were, instead, the proximal stimulus.) Speciﬁcally, surface
color, such as the red of Norm’s tomato, would be a sensible quality of material
surfaces determined by their disposition to reﬂect light. (Hilbert, 1987, inaugurates
this contemporary tradition.) Similarly, volume color, such as the golden color of
Chardonnay, would be a sensible quality of a material volumes determined by their
disposition to transmit light; and radiant color, such as the green of a traﬃc light,
would be a sensible quality of light sources determined by their disposition to emit
light. (Though perhaps there is no theoretically interesting distinction between
these latter kinds of color; perhaps, as Byrne and Hilbert, 2003, maintain, they
belong to the unitary class of productances.)
The conception of colors as tertiary qualities, as described here, is neutral be-
tween reductive and nonreductive understanding of the colors. Chromatic tertiary
qualities of material surfaces might be reﬂectance properties represented by sets of
surface spectral reﬂectances—the surface’s disposition to reﬂect a certain amount
of light at each of the wavelengths of the visible spectrum (see Hilbert, 1987, and
Byrne and Hilbert, 1997, 2003) or they might be primitive qualities that supervene
on these (see Broackes, 1997 and Yablo, 1995). On either understanding, tertiary
qualities are objective features of the material environment. Chromatic similari-
ties grounded in the propensity of things to aﬀect light in certain ways are objective
similarities that a perceiver can encounter in the material environment.
If redness is a tertiary quality, then red surfaces are disposed to reﬂect light dif-
ferently in diﬀerent conditions of illumination, since the spectral power distribu-
tion of the reﬂected light is a product of the illuminant and the surface spectral
reﬂectance. So, holding the reﬂectance property of the tomato ﬁxed, the spectral
composition of the light reﬂected from a red tomato in noon daylight will diﬀer
from the spectral composition of the light reﬂected from the red tomato on an
overcast afternoon, given the diﬀerent character of the illuminant. Suppose that
the visual system provides information not just about the reﬂectance properties
of objects but also about the way those objects are illuminated. The way an ob-
ject is illuminated is a property of the object and not the illuminant—it is how the
object is illuminated and not how the illuminant is (though, of course, these are
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related). The pattern of sameness and diﬀerence characteristic of color constancy
would then be explained in terms of what is presented in color perception. Norm’s
experiences of the tomato in noon daylight and on an overcast afternoon are the
same to the extent that they present the same color to Norm—the redness of the
tomato; they diﬀer to the extent that they present the tomato as diﬀerently illu-
minated. (Hilbert, forthcoming, 12, observes that “One consequence of this …is
that the color appearance of an object must have more than the traditional three
dimensions of variation.” The three-dimensional color space is, anyway, visibly in-
adequate—where in the three-dimensional color space is metallic green?)
If colors were ways of aﬀecting light, then diﬀerent qualitative aspects of red’s
nature would be perceptually available under diﬀerent conditions of illumination.
Diﬀerent visible aspects of the color’s constant capacity to modify light would
be perceptually available in diﬀerent circumstances of perception. According to
Broackes:
…this conception explains how it is that in order to tell what colour an
object is, we may try it out in a number of diﬀerent lighting environ-
ments. It is not that we are trying to get it into one single ‘standard’
lighting condition, at which point it will, so to speak, shine in its true
colours. Rather, we are looking, in the way it handles a variety of diﬀer-
ent illuminations (all of which are more or less ‘normal’), for its constant
capacity to modify light. (Broackes, 1997, 215)
Diﬀerent aspects of a color’s qualitative nature are perceptually available in dif-
ferent conditions of illumination. In certain conditions, it is only by experiencing
these diﬀerent qualitative aspects that a perceiver can come to know which color
he is perceiving. So consider again an environment populated by metameric pairs.
Under conditions of illumination prevalent in that environment, the same qualita-
tive aspect is manifest by distinct colors. Distinct colors share a qualitative aspect
that is perceptually available in the same circumstances of perception. It is only
by experiencing a qualitative aspect of a color under diﬀerent conditions of illumi-
nation that distinguishes it from its metameric counterpart, that a perceiver can
come to know which color it is.
In general, a presentational phenomenology is required if the phenomenal prop-
erties of perceptual experience are to have a positive epistemic signiﬁcance. The
immediate, noninferential perceptual judgments that a subject is liable to form on
the basis of experiences with a distinctive phenomenology have as their subject
matter those features of the material environment that are among the causal an-
tecedents of such experiences. Those judgments are at least warranted if not indeed
a mode of knowledge of those features because the phenomenal character of the
experiences that prompt them are determined by their presenting precisely those
features. The phenomenal properties of experience can have a positive epistemic
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signiﬁcance if they are determined by the presentation of the truthmakers of the
perceptual judgments that subjects are liable to form on the basis of such expe-
riences. Norm is in a position to know which color he is perceiving because the
phenomenal character of his color experience in daylight is determined by a qual-
itative aspect of that color, present in experience, that suﬃces to distinguish it
from its metameric counterpart. Phenomenology can have the positive epistemic
signiﬁcance it manifestly has if it is determined, at least in part, by the presentation
of the truthmakers of perceptual judgment (see Johnston, 2006; Martin, 2002).
§ 6 ILLuSION, PH!NOM!NOLOGY, AND KNOWL!DG!
Even granting the conception of colors as tertiary qualities, one might legitimately
worry whether the phenomenal diﬀerence between Norm’s experience in the store
and in broad daylight suﬃces for knowing which color he is perceiving.
Suppose that object o instantiates color c and is in an environment known to be
populated with metameric pairs. Norm undergoes color experience e1 when look-
ing at o in the circumstances of perception and undergoes a phenomenally distinct
color experience e2 when looking at o under diﬀerent conditions of illumination. It
is by undergoing the phenomenally distinct experiences e1 and e2 that Norm comes
to know which color o is, namely c. By hypothesis, e1 and e2 are veridical color ex-
periences. According to the story so far, the phenomenal diﬀerence between them
is entirely due to diﬀerent aspects of the qualitative nature of the color being per-
ceptually available under diﬀerent conditions of illumination. But now consider
experiences e1∗ and e2∗ that are introspectively indistinguishable from e1 and e2
respectively. e1∗ and e2∗, however, unlike e1 and e2, are i#usory—the object o that
Norm perceives when undergoing e1∗ and e2∗ does not instantiate the relevant
color, c. Norm could not come to know which color o is, namely c, since o is not in
fact c. If, as seems plausible, two experiences being introspectively indistinguish-
able suﬃces for their being phenomenally identical, then there is a problem. How
can the phenomenology have the positive epistemic signiﬁcance I claim that it
has if in one case the phenomenally distinct color experiences suﬃce for knowing
which color the object is but not in the other?
Consider two experiences that are introspectively indistinguishable. The fact
that they are introspectively indistinguishable may establish that they share a phe-
nomenal property in common, but is it obvious that they share every phenomenal
property in common? Is it obvious that the introspectively indistinguishable ex-
periences are phenomenally identical? Even if they share a phenomenal property,
there would remain a phenomenological diﬀerence.
First, consider the case of sensory imagining. Recall that Martin (2002) argues
that the phenomenal diﬀerence between the perception of a sensible quality and
the sensory imagining of that quality is due to the way the sensible quality is pre-
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sented in perception and sensory imagination. Martin’s positive suggestion may in-
telligibly be doubted. Thus, it is at least arguable that there is a diﬀerence in what
is presented in perception and visual imagination. In veridical color perception,
we are perceptually presented with a color instance, while in visual imagination we
are presented with an uninstantiated color. Of course, there is a sense in which the
universal is presented diﬀerently in perception and imagination. If the universal is
present in its instance, either wholly or in part, then perhaps it is present as well
in the veridical perception of it. But if so, there is a diﬀerence in the manner in
which it is present in imagination, since imagination presents the universal without
the corresponding instance. This is nevertheless consistent with the phenomenal
diﬀerence between perception and visual imagination being entirely due to the dif-
ference in their object, in what is present in perception and imagination—a color
instance and an uninstantiated color, respectively. (I do not mean to claim that
this observation is suﬃcient to meet Martin’s challenge to representationalism.)
There is a corresponding phenomenal diﬀerence between Norm’s veridical red
experience and its illusory counterpart. Norm’s veridical red experience and its il-
lusory counterpart diﬀer in object. Whereas the veridical experience is a conscious
manifestation of a determinate, spatiotemporally located, color instance, the il-
lusory counterpart is not. After all, in the illusory case, there is no determinate,
spatiotemporally located, color instance to be presented. In veridical color percep-
tion, Norm is perceptually presented with a color instance, while in the illusory
counterpart no such color instance is presented. But that is a phenomenological
diﬀerence—the two conscious episodes diﬀer in their objects, in what they are
experiences of.
Cases of veridical illusion, of the kind discussed by Lewis (1986), poses a poten-
tial problem for this suggestion. A perceiver is subject to veridical illusion when he
has an unreliable but matching chromatic experience of a scene. Though veridical,
the immediate, noninferential perceptual judgments he is liable to form on their
basis are not warranted nor are they a mode of chromatic knowledge. Unlike, or-
dinary forms of illusion, in the case of veridical illusion, there is a determinate,
spatiotemporally located, color instance that experience relates the perceiver to.
Lewis’ case of veridical illusion involves hypothetical prosthetic vision. Tertiary
quality theorists are independently committed to actual cases of veridical illusion. If
colors are ways of aﬀecting light, then polychromatic and non-uniformly lit three-
dimensional scenes are more conducive to determining the color of a surface than
a monochromatic and uniformly lit two-dimensional background. Why? Colors
are qualities determined by dispositions to aﬀect light, speciﬁcally, in the case of
surface color, they are anthropocentrically determined reﬂectance properties rep-
resented by, if not identiﬁed with, classes of surface spectral reﬂectances whose
structure reﬂects the structure of the visual system. However, the proximal visual
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stimulus cannot, by itself, determine distal reﬂectance properties. The proximal
stimulus is a spectral power distribution that is itself the function of the reﬂectance
and the illuminant. To determine the distal reﬂectance property from the proxi-
mate stimulus the visual system needs to make assumptions about the nature and
location of the illuminant. The visual system relies on spectral information from
the general scene as evidence about the nature and location of the illuminant. The
problem is that a monochromatic and uniformly lit two-dimensional background
does not convey suﬃcient information about the illuminant to accurately deter-
mine the distal reﬂectance property. Perception of surface color is unreliable in
those circumstances just as it is when it is suﬃciently dark or when the illuminant
is strongly colored. Most likely color perception is illusory in such circumstances,
or if it is veridical, it is only accidentally so. Where color perception in these cir-
cumstances is accidentally veridical the perceiver is subject to veridical illusion.
In cases of veridical illusion, the experience matches the color instance present
in the scene but is unreliable and, hence, illusory. So it could not be the case that
what distinguishes an experience from a veridical illusion introspectively indistin-
guishable from it is that one but not the other is related to a color instance. In each
case, the experience relates the perceiver to the instantiated color. If the veridical
experience and the introspectively indistinguishable veridical illusion are phenom-
enally identical, then phenomenal character could not have the positive epistemic
signiﬁcance I claim that it has—Norm could not come to know which color he is
perceiving on the basis of a veridical illusion.
In veridical illusion, experience may match the color instance present in the
scene, but is the color instance present in the perceiver’s experience of the scene?
Here, the objector faces a dilemma. If the color instance is present in the perceiver’s
experience, then the perceiver is seeing it and the experience is nonillusory. After
all, if, in the given circumstances, the color instance is indeed consciously present
in experience, then what reason could there be to deny that that experience is a
source of knowledge of that instance? It is plausible, then, that in veridical illusion,
while the perceiver is related to the color instance, the relation is something other
than the presentation relation. The visual system, functioning normally in other
circumstances, may make it possible for elements of the perceiver’s environment to
be present in his experience of that environment. However, in the special circum-
stances under consideration, the visual system, in lacking suﬃcient information
about the illuminant to reliably determine the instantiated color, could not make
it the case that the color instance is present in the perceiver’s experience (even if
it is as if it is present in the perceiver’s experience). But if the color is not present
in the perceiver’s experience, then the veridical illusion diﬀers in object from the
nonillusory veridical counterpart—the color instance is present in the latter but
not the former. While in the case of veridical illusion, the color instance may be
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the causal antecedent of the experience, it is not the object of that experience.
(Compare Sturgeon, 2006, 186, on veridical illusion.)
That introspectively indistinguishable experiences can diﬀer in object and, hence,
phenomenology will seem plausible or not depending on the underlying conception
of experience. Any remaining doubts about this claim may be due to the lingering
eﬀects of an epistemologically inadequate conception of experience.
On the naïve conception of color experience, the phenomenal character of color
experience is determined by the qualitative character of the perceived color. So
conceived, color experience provides a partial perspective on the chromatic fea-
tures of the material environment. To know what it is like to undergo a color expe-
rience would be to know the color selectively presented to the perceiver’s partial
perspective (see Nagel, 1979, 166, 172, 173–4). An experience would be intrinsically
connected to its subject matter since experience, so conceived, just is a perceptual
presentation of that subject matter to a perceiver’s partial perspective. But veridi-
cal and illusory color experiences that are introspectively indistinguishable diﬀer
precisely in this way, in what they selectively present—the former presents a color
instance and the latter does not. The introspectively indistinguishable experiences
would be phenomenologically distinct since they would diﬀer in object.
This contrasts with the conception of color experience as the qualitative eﬀect
of the material environment. On this conception, the claim that introspectively
indistinguishable experiences can diﬀer in phenomenology will seem implausible.
After all, so conceived, color experience is a qualitative state of the perceiver, a con-
scious modiﬁcation of the subject. As a conscious modiﬁcation of the subject it is
natural to think of the qualitative state as being wholly accessible to introspection.
And if color phenomenology is wholly determined by the qualitative character of
this state (and, hence, independently of any subject matter extrinsic to that state),
then phenomenologically distinct color experiences would be introspectively dis-
tinguishable. This conception of color experience failed, however, to account for
the positive epistemic signiﬁcance of color phenomenology and so should be re-
jected along with any doubts it may ground about the phenomenal distinctness of
introspectively indistinguishable experiences.
§ 7 CONCLuSION
When Norm undergoes phenomenally distinct color experiences under diﬀerent
conditions of illumination, there are diﬀerent ways the color appears to Norm.
In the store, under initial conditions of illumination, the color appears a certain
way, it presents a qualitative aspect in common with its metameric counterpart. In
broad daylight, the color appears another way, it presents a qualitative aspect that
distinguishes it from its metameric counterpart. These distinct ways of appearing
are not properties of Norm’s experience of the color, but are properties the color is
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perceived to have. It is only by presenting a further qualitative aspect of the color, a
qualitative aspect perceptually available in daylight and not the store, that Norm’s
experience allows him to distinguish the color from its metameric counterpart and
so come to know which color he is perceiving.
In order for Norm’s color experience to have the positive epistemic signiﬁcance
that it manifestly has, it must provide him a partial perspective on the chromatic
features of the material environment. In the store, under initial conditions of il-
lumination, Norm perceives what the color is like—but only to a limited extent.
While Norm can perceive that the color is a determinate of suﬃciently broad color
determinables, not every aspect of the color is manifest to Norm in his initial expe-
rience of it. His experience in broad daylight presents another aspect of the color.
And it is the appearance of this qualitatively distinct aspect in that circumstance
that makes it evident to Norm which color that he is perceiving.
The epistemology of color experience is grounded in its presentational phe-
nomenology. The truth of a perceptual judgment and the phenomenal character
of the experience that elicits it are codetermined by the perceived color instance.
The phenomenal character of color experience is determined less by a monadic
quality of that experience, than by the color selectively present to the perceiver’s
partial perspective. Norm’s phenomenally distinct color experiences are not qual-
itatively distinct modes of presentation of the color, rather the phenomenally dis-
tinct color experiences present qualitatively distinct aspects of the perceived color.
The phenomenal character of color experience, so conceived, is inherited from the
qualitative character of the perceived color, thus partially vindicating our naïve,
prephilosophical conception of color experience.
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